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The Politics of Postcapitalism: Labour and our
Digital Futures
JON CRUDDAS AND FREDERICK HARRY PITTS
Abstract
This article introduces the special issue on the politics of postcapitalism. Considering the the-
oretical foundations, empirical perspectives and political ramifications of claims made about
a coming ‘post-work’ or ‘postcapitalist’ society, it maps existing debates through a discussion
of two key recent texts, Paul Mason’s Clear Bright Future and Aaron Bastani’s Fully Automated
Luxury Communism. It first surveys how the relationship between labour market trends, tech-
nological change and wider political-economic shifts is articulated in the postcapitalist litera-
ture. It then explores how concepts from Marx are deployed to depict social relations as a
constraint on technological development and its utopian potentialities, leading to political
demands for new class actors and electoral blocs centring on the new forms of economic and
political activity associated with digital networks. It also considers the role of the state and
how this theoretical and political approach envisions historical change, situating utopian
visions of an incipient postcapitalist alternative to capitalism within the contemporary politi-
cal context of authoritarian populism and challenges to liberal democracy. Finally, it explores
the continuing relevance of humanism as a critical counterpoint to the social and philosophi-
cal agenda of present day ‘posthumanism’. It concludes that, in unfavourable political condi-
tions, it would be strategically unwise to stake too much on an over-optimistic approach to
the unfolding future. This outlook, it is suggested, carries considerable risks and conse-
quences for a contemporary left in search of a viable electoral coalition and route back to
power.
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Introduction
ENVISIONING THE END of work and the implemen-
tation of a universal basic income (UBI),
recent years have witnessed an intellectual
renewal in how the left understands labour
and the future of capitalism. Its narrative
deploys a broadly Marxist theoretical inheri-
tance to celebrate the substitution of human
labour with technology, and the replacement
of the traditional class base of the left with a
new urban, networked, educated youth for
whom modern technological change creates
unique possibilities to transcend capitalist
society and, in some cases, the human condi-
tion itself. Through influential articles and
books discussing ‘accelerationism’, ‘postcapi-
talism’ and ‘fully automated luxury commu-
nism’, such ideas populate broadsheet
columns, policy seminars and the wider
activist imagination.1 Unravelling at the time
of writing, the Corbynist ascendency in the
UK Labour Party has incubated these ideas
and their carriers. Seeking solutions to the
intellectual and electoral crisis of social
democracy, this thinking constitutes one of
the richest and most stimulating sides of the
contested theoretical project constructed
around Corbyn’s leadership. Policies coloured
by this vision of the future populated
Labour’s manifesto in the recent general elec-
tion, but the party failed to understand the
public perception that its pledges placed too
much emphasis on preparing for the develop-
ment of a new world in the shell of an old one
that they seemed to have lost touch with.2
This special issue introduces and unpicks
some of the intellectual wiring behind this
emerging thinking on postcapitalism and the
post-work society on the contemporary left.
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Following this introduction, which explores
the politics of postcapitalism with reference
to the two latest and most salient additions
to its growing literature in the UK political
sphere, Paul Mason’s Clear Bright Future and
Aaron Bastani’s Fully Automated Luxury Com-
munism, the first part of the issue considers
the empirical claims made around the chang-
ing face of work and economic life in con-
temporary capitalism and the potential for a
postcapitalist or post-work alternatives.3
Mason opens with an account of the practi-
cal and policy agenda underpinning his
vision of the ‘postcapitalist transition’. Paul
Thompson contests portrayals of a present
day ‘tipping point’ towards a post-work
society. Julie Macleavy and Andrew Lap-
worth consider the implications a ‘post-
work’ future holds for everyday practices of
work in the context of contemporary labour
market trends. Lorena Lombardozzi scruti-
nises the implications of one of the primary
postcapitalist policy proposals—the universal
basic income (UBI)—and its potential
impacts upon gender inequality inside and
outside the labour market. Lisa Nandy
relates debates about future demographic
and labour market changes to the practical
realities of constructing electoral coalitions in
contemporary Britain.
The second part of the special issue con-
siders the wider political underpinnings and
consequences of this vision of capitalism and
its transformation. Matt Bolton surveys the
transatlantic ‘democratic socialist’ resurgence
and its understanding of capitalism and its
alternatives. Anton J€ager considers what past
populisms can tell us about the productivist,
anti-rentier politics characterising the con-
temporary left. Bridget Phillipson sets out
the opportunities and limitations of state
power in support of social transformation
within the context of contemporary UK polit-
ical economy. Florence Gildea reviews the
vital contribution of Srnicek and Williams’s
Inventing the Future to the postcapitalist liter-
ature, and the posthumanist implications of
their ‘accelerationism’. Picking up this
thread, Harry Pitts discusses how postcapi-
talism’s political tensions and contradictions
both inform and are informed by the the-
matic and strategic shifts undertaken in the
work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri.
The absolute state of things to
come
The essence of the postcapitalist vision is ‘a
world beyond jobs, profit and even scar-
city’.4 Postcapitalism here represents the lat-
est development of capitalist productive
capabilities, harnessing new technologies to
transcend capitalism itself for a qualitatively
different society. It proposes that continued
increases in human productivity from a
‘combination of computing power, globaliza-
tion and rising educational levels’ precipitate
a ‘decisive human take-off which propels us
towards economic abundance’.5 Perhaps
most significantly, robotics, ‘thinking machi-
nes’, and automated technologies, have the
potential to liberate humankind from physi-
cal work and the proliferation of free goods.6
In the ‘expanded leisure time’ facilitated by
the ‘reduction of hours worked’, humans
will be free to avail themselves of new levels
of ‘freedom and self-knowledge’. This is sel-
dom presented as an outcome accomplished
automatically by technology itself, but
requires political work to harness new tech-
nologies like artificial intelligence to ‘design
and run the systems we need to survive on
this planet’ and autonomous systems to per-
form working tasks ‘without human guid-
ance’. Nothing less than the obliteration of
‘class divisions, hierarchies, poverty, oppres-
sion and inequality’ follows. Thus, ‘informa-
tion technology makes Utopian Socialism
possible’.7
However, as Thompson makes clear in his
contribution, the forecast labour market
effects of automation empirically challenge
this utopian portrayal of an escape from
drudgery. Whilst White House figures sug-
gest an ‘83 per cent chance that workers
earning less than $20 per hour will lose their
jobs to robots in the medium term’, it may
well be the case that more complex problem-
solving roles are automated first.8 As Bastani
notes, this is due to the greater ‘processor
power’ required for the ‘motor-sensory cou-
pling, spatial awareness and unanticipated
responses’ needed to replace manual tasks.9
As regards analytical tasks, meanwhile,
Deloitte figures suggest that around 40 per
cent of all jobs in the legal sector face a like-
lihood of automation in the next two
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decades—some 114,000 jobs—on top of
31,000 jobs already eliminated.10 This evi-
dence suggests that professional jobs with
prestige, perks and decent terms and condi-
tions may be the first to go, rather than the
drudgery to which automated luxury is
posed as an alternative.
Indeed, Mason and Bastani recognise that
empirical trends confound attempts to paint
capitalist development bending inevitably
towards automated utopia. In the noughties,
productivity growth and technological inno-
vation declined. Rather than a given,
whether firms automate production is ‘an
outgrowth of competition, the prevailing
logic of capitalism’. Evidence shows the
degree of automation in the economy slow-
ing in recent decades, ‘primarily as a result
of wages being pushed so low that replacing
workers wasn’t profitable’.11 Citing David
Graeber’s theoretically and empirically ques-
tionable ‘bullshit jobs’ thesis, Mason
observes that, ‘far from automating produc-
tion, advanced market economies are creat-
ing millions of jobs that do not need to
exist’.12 In this unfavourable context, ‘post-
work’ aims are perhaps better addressed to
reshaping the sphere of social reproduction
than production proper—something
Macleavy and Lapworth’s contribution to
this special issue highlights.
Both Mason and Bastani explain the dis-
tance between reality and ‘fully automated’
utopia with reference to two posthumously
published fragments from Marx. Firstly, the
1859 Preface to the Critique of Political Econ-
omy, which outlines Marx’s ‘fetters’ theory of
history centring on the dynamic relationship
between the forces and relations of produc-
tion.13 Secondly, the 1858 ‘Fragment on
Machines’ from Marx’s Grundrisse, which
outlines a future where technological devel-
opment bursts through capitalist frameworks
of labour and valorisation.14 For Mason and
Bastani, the former explains why things do
not happen according to plan, but might do
so given the right political and regulatory
environment, whereas the latter explains
why some day things definitely will unfold
according to the postcapitalist vision of the
future.
A stagist understanding of societal trans-
formation is derived from Marx’s dialectical
presentation of the progression of history in
these fragments, whereby the technological
forces of production must reach their fullest
development for the path to open to what-
ever follows—in this case, a ‘postcapitalist’
society. This means that political struggle for
the latter depends upon the full blossoming
of present technological capacities, helping
accomplish their revolutionary trajectory. For
instance, ICT-enabled ‘collaborative produc-
tion’ in the peer-to-peer open source econ-
omy helps nurture the new society in the
shell of the old.15
When the ‘cultural, legal, social and ideo-
logical superstructure’ of society—in other
words, the relations of production—‘fetter’
the development on the technological forces
of production, the former must adapt.16
Marx eventually surpassed such a crude
base-superstructure understanding of society,
but it lives on in the economic determinism
of successive generations of socialists.
Indeed, the political consequence of seeing
social relations simply fetter and follow the
productive forces is clear when Bastani rele-
gates ‘legal and political rights’ and ‘liberal
ends of personal fulfilment and self-author-
ship’ as secondary to foundational ‘socialist
means’ of ‘economic and social resources’.17
The point at which the relations of produc-
tion act as a fetter upon the forces, for both
Bastani and Mason, has already been reached,
with established forms of private property
unable to accommodate the increased ‘social-
ization of knowledge’ that technological pro-
gress implies.18 Attempting to enclose this
socialisation, monopolistic ownership struc-
tures represented in ascendant platform firms
in turn constrain the dynamism of these tech-
nological tendencies. Technological innova-
tions ‘bringing extreme supply to
information, labour and resources’ under-
mine conventional economic presumptions
about the scarcity undergirding capitalist val-
uation and exchange.19 Mason describes how
from the 1990s onwards, traditional account-
ing has struggled to capture the impact of
information technology upon economic
growth. Some see information technology
contributing indirectly through facilitating
quicker, more transparent, and more competi-
tive online transactions. Price cannot measure
it, just as the wage does not measure the vast
expanse of ‘free’ labour performed by internet
users at home. For Mason, this incapacity to
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capture the value of technology and labour
conceals an expansion of use-value concur-
rent with a failure of established measures to
express the exchange-value of products and
their creation.
Bastani, meanwhile, follows mainstream
economics in suggesting that the ‘zero mar-
ginal cost’ of informational goods—examples
cited include robot design and drug patents
—debilitates not only traditional business
models based on sales margins, but capital-
ism itself, identified as the production of
things for profit.20 More circumspect about
such a transformation, Mason sees a continu-
ing capacity to contain the crisis of value in
the platform economy’s ‘network effects’ and
monopoly tendencies.21 Capital responds to
infotech’s effects on ‘prices, automation, net-
works and availability’, Mason argues,
through ‘vast monopolies whose main aim is
to supress the free, competitive formation of
prices, and to eradicate competition in entire
swathes of the market’, as well as laying
claim to ‘artificial forms of ownership over
information: extensions of copyright, com-
plex legal obligations, intellectual property
laws’. Where prices are ‘difficult to form’
and profits thus ‘difficult to achieve’, plat-
form firms valorise ‘positive spillovers’ like
Facebook interactions.22 Thus for Mason the
postcapitalist transition is ‘fettered’ by out-
dated productive relations.
Politically, this results in a productivist
and populist anti-rentier positioning that,
depicting platform rentiers leeching upon an
otherwise freely disposed of commonwealth
of knowledge logically and ethically preced-
ing capitalist capture, seeks to eradicate the
‘economic rents’ that info-capitalists extract
from ‘everyday interactions’ and ‘suppress
all business models based on rent-seeking’ in
order to ‘make the seeking of economic rent
socially unacceptable’. The alternative, we
are told, is ‘real entrepreneurship’ focussed
on the emergent infrastructure of ‘non-prof-
its, collaborative production, the peer-to-peer
economy and open source software and
standards’—a ‘sharing economy’ that is itself
arguably a result, rather than simply a vic-
tim, of over-accumulated capital’s search for
a return on investment in an age short on
other routes.23 The boundary work policing
what is productive and unproductive here
seems more redolent of the anti-rentier
populists J€ager surveys in his contribution to
this special issue than what passes at first
glance for anti-productivist, anti-work politi-
cal programme.
As Bolton notes in his contribution, the ‘fet-
ters’ view of history has the effect of suggest-
ing capitalist social relations impose
themselves upon an otherwise natural social-
ism expressed in the forces of production,
and it is simply a case of absolving this pre-
existing state of affairs of the artificiality of
capitalist social relations to let those forces
run free. But the underlying forces driving
free information goods, and so on, did not
come into the world possessed of an
untouched, free and natural goodness, spoilt
by the capitalist relations of their production
and consumption. They are the result of, and
conditioned by, these relations from the off.
Such a notion nonetheless permeates the
postcapitalist literature. Scarcity, for instance,
is nothing more than a ‘political imposition’
that the informational forces of production
are helping undo. However, there is some
recognition that info-capitalism’s technologi-
cal potentialities do not unlock utopia in and
of themselves, but their unfolding depends
on ‘the political, ethical and social contexts’
from which advances emerge. Scarcity being,
for Bastani, a political imposition, it is also a
political condition that can be removed with
‘immediate action’. Whilst ‘extreme supply’
creates the conditions for ‘fully automated
luxury communism’, the latter is not an
inevitability, but ‘a politics’ that ‘maps’ the
future.24 Similarly, Mason rows back on some
of the more exuberant claims made in his first
book, presenting a state of technological
abundance as something to ‘try to achieve’
rather than existing in the here and now.25
This ‘political realism’ plays a key part in
the closer interface struck between postcapi-
talist and post-work thinking and centre-left
policy making in recent years. This proxim-
ity gives Bastani’s ‘communism’ a quaint
feel, relying as it does on technocratic tweaks
like greater ‘access to credit’ for ‘coopera-
tives and worker-owned business’ that
would then, like the Preston Model, provide
local services in a form of ‘municipal protec-
tionism’ supported at the national level by
an overarching system of universal basic ser-
vices (UBS).26 Whilst possessed of a welcome
pragmatism, statements arguing that ‘UBS
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begins the work of communism in the pre-
sent, articulating resources necessary to a
decent life’, depending as it would on a state
subsisting on capitalist profit, leave a some-
what underwhelming impression of the seri-
ousness of this purported break with the
present. The evidence for the utopian possi-
bilities which postcapitalists perceive in con-
temporary economic life is arguably too
weak to risk time and resources building a
programme around such thin political gruel.
Tellingly, examples cited in support of the
catch-all solution of ‘central planning’
include no less than Walmart and Amazon.27
As political defeats mount, it is an oft-sta-
ted and self-conscious caveat common to the
post-work literature that these technological
trends will not accomplish themselves, but
must rather be regulated into existence. The
robotisation of production is an effect of
other imperatives and incentives in the econ-
omy as a whole, but the question is seldom
raised as to whether the outcome of greater
automation is worth the political-economic
paths that must be navigated to achieve it.
The recent announcement of a new UK
migration policy implies that reduced access
to cheap European labour will incentivise
employers to recruit higher paid, higher
skilled local labour, or invest in productiv-
ity-raising labour substitution technologies.
Whilst these dynamics are already in play in
some areas of agriculture, their application
to the service-intensive work the government
appears to have in mind—care or hospitality
—is questionable.28
To take one example: the resurgence of
hand carwashes and the untimely disappear-
ance of the apparently more advanced auto-
mated alternative has been supported by the
illegal exploitation of migrant labour in a
deregulated labour market.29 Are tighter bor-
ders a price worth paying for greater invest-
ment in labour-saving technologies like the
machine carwash that, we are told, will liber-
ate us all in the long run? Most of its adher-
ents would no doubt disagree, but often the
post-work imaginary elides the character of
the state within which its projections will
unfold.30 Where the state’s powers of policy
making and regulation do pop up in the
postcapitalist conversation, it is either to
hedge some of the more technological deter-
minist ideas circulating in this body of
literature, explain why things may not pan
out the way this prospectus anticipates, or
recommend practical steps for how it can be
better brought about in the context of con-
temporary capitalism unprecedently short on
growth, productivity, and innovation—
hardly favourable conditions for the kind of
‘fully automated’ future some anticipate. The
issue of how the left approaches and wields
the state is addressed in Bridget Phillipson’s
contribution to this special issue.
Regulation is a convenient alibi against
accusations of technological determinism,
but the presence of the state is no guarantee
that the roll-out of technology will have an
outcome favourable to the cause of human
liberation. The relationship between the state
and technology is a pressing issue at a time
when the coronavirus crisis is exposing ten-
dencies already in train towards the generali-
sation of a digitally-enabled, interventionist,
authoritarian mode of governance. Whilst
the medical evidence may well merit them,
the measures possible in a totalitarian state
like China set the template for state action
elsewhere in response to the spread of the
virus, even if adopted reluctantly in liberal
democracies like the UK. The question is
whether, once uncorked, the restrictions on
freedoms can be rebottled, or whether the
lasting effect of the current turmoil will
bring not the end of neoliberalism, as some
foresee, but rather something much worse.
For Mason, China leads the way in a ‘digital
feudalism’ whereby regime power stimulates
development of new technologies of absolute
‘digital surveillance and algorithmic control’
and these technologies in turn enrich the
power of the regime.31 Chinese success in
the technology sphere—in particular in state
priority areas like semiconductors, artificial
intelligence and biotech—cannot be sepa-
rated from its authoritarian aspirations. The
implementation of the Social Credit system
in China epitomises the coincidence of cen-
tralised state power and distributed ICT.
Determining access to benefits and other ser-
vices, as well as accumulating a vast body of
data on the Chinese populace, the Social
Credit system will evaluate citizens accord-
ing to peer-rated categories like creditworthi-
ness and political loyalty.
As its model of authoritarian governance
proves itself as the optimum contemporary
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means of administering capitalism, using
new technology to solve perceived social
problems and control citizenries, Mason sees
this model becoming increasingly popular
and viable beyond China, independent of
the latter’s growing sphere of influence
through business and economic initiatives.
Indeed, rates of digital innovation and devel-
opment are surging in precisely those states
experimenting with the most authoritarian
modes of governance, whereas in the social
and liberal democracies they are lagging
behind.32 Whilst this might simply represent
the extra room to grow in developing coun-
try contexts, it indicates that digital innova-
tion in and of itself is not a good thing and
should not be divorced of the social and
political context in which it is taking place
and the ends of which it is put in service. As
an economically interventionist, politically
authoritarian politics poses itself worldwide
as a solution to issues of capitalist reproduc-
tion with much wider purchase than in
China alone—especially in the context of a
public health emergency with lasting import
for how we live our lives—the resonance
between technological development and
authoritarianism forecloses a dystopian,
rather than utopian, future.
The rise and fall of the networked
individual
Submitting superstructural social relations to
the requirements of technological progress,
Mason associates the domination of human
and non-human life under official commu-
nist regimes like China with the mistaken
application of a ‘fetters’ theory of history
that suggests social life in any epoch must
flex to fit the forces of production. Whereas
the ‘fetters’ theory of history ultimately
grants us only an understanding of capital-
ism’s survival, Mason argues, it takes Marx’s
posthumously rediscovered but seemingly
prophetic ‘Fragment on Machines’, to give
us a theory of capitalism’s demise. The Frag-
ment depicts the ‘general intellect’ embodied
in machines replacing direct human labour
in the production process. Marx later sur-
passed a simple labour theory of value
equating direct labour time with the produc-
tion of value, but for Fragment-thinkers like
Mason, such a theory underpins the associa-
tion drawn between the substitution of
human labour in the production process
with a crisis in capitalism’s capacity to create
and capture value.33
This crisis, adherents propose, precipitates
the germination of a new postcapitalist order
from within capitalism itself, smashing class
structures. Granting textual justification for
the celebration and acceleration of the substi-
tution of human labour—and the class that
lives by it—with technology, significant
political consequences flow from this reading
of a small, discarded and theoretically sur-
passed few pages of Marx’s notebooks. It
provides a theoretical foundation for reset-
ting the base of the left away from a dis-
cernible labour interest in and around a
notion of the working class, an embrace of
technological change sometimes endowed
with an anti-humanist technological deter-
minism, and the belief in a new political cos-
mos built around an urban networked
youth. The future political base of the left is
no longer anchored around a ‘labour inter-
est’ dismissed as political nostalgia. The site
of political struggle expands from the factory
to wider society as the wage-labour relation-
ship offers diminishing returns for the left as
a result of desirable technological shifts.
Within these terms, the demand for a UBI
follows, explored in Lombardozzi’s contribu-
tion. It is a policy proponents have been
keen to push in the context of the economic
turmoil caused by the coronavirus pandemic.
Curiously enough, Donald Trump stands
alone in having seriously considered a blan-
ket payment, while other democracies, like
the UK, have opted for a more complex
array of targeted measures. The pattern of
UBI’s uptake indicates its political ambiva-
lence in a populist age.
To replace a working class on the wane,
the intellectual repositioning inspired by
Fragment-thinking also seeks new class sub-
jects brought into being by the unfolding
forces of production to complete their revo-
lutionary trajectory. The turn to social move-
ments seems a response to the sheer scale of
the political regulation required to control
and humanise new technology. Whereas the
standards and regulations that enforce social
and political interests against capitalist
exploitation in the sphere of production are
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fairly well-established now, no such common
standards and regulations exist to police the
interests of capital in the implementation of
artificial intelligence. As Mason notes, if AI
is not set ‘cooperative goals’ in line with a
wider ‘legal enforcement structure’ similar to
that which human society is already subject
to, then it runs the risk of developing in an
increasingly uncontrollable and ‘sociopathic’
direction. Whereas ‘autonomous artificial
intelligences cannot be safely deployed
under any form of market-driven capitalism’,
Mason writes, where they are ‘deployed into
socially useful applications under meaning-
ful, ethical human control, AI could be the
tool that liberates humanity’.34 Regardless of
the flaws of the ‘fetters’ view of history that
ascribes to this potential, the political effort
required to fit the relations of production to
the oncoming technological forces would be
so great as to seem entirely unachievable,
taking nothing less that the design and
implementation of ‘a new global system to
utilize the capabilities of automation, reduce
the amount of work needed to keep us alive
on the planet and in the process stabilize the
planet’s ecosystem’, as well as regulate AI,
protect data rights and defend against algo-
rithmic control.35 Whilst some of these might
be possible as part of a wider political effort
to preserve aspects of the imperfect present,
when put together they make any positive
or utopian outcome to these processes sound
nigh-on impossible.
In light of the substantial barriers to such
a programme—not least the repeated failure
of leftists to seize state power—social move-
ments enter stage left as a means of generat-
ing a ‘politics’ capable of shepherding the
technological forces along. This implies a
‘collective subject with specific demands’
tied to the technological expansion of abun-
dance, leisure and luxury.36 Mason casts in
this role the figure of the ‘networked indi-
vidual’, including ‘small, often socially-con-
scious, entrepreneurs and large numbers of
people who work in a globalised corporate
environment’.37 It is the networked individ-
ual, and not technology alone, that will
accomplish the leap into a postcapitalist soci-
ety of technological abundance, endless lei-
sure and free goods.
In the wake of technological changes in
how people live and work, the networked
individual chimes with a dramatic redefini-
tion of the left across western market econo-
mies. Mason identifies the ‘new core of the
Labour project’ in ‘the big cities, among the
salariat and among the globally orientated,
educated part of the workforce’.38 Associat-
ing Corbyn’s leadership with this political
vision of (post)capitalist transformation,
Mason eulogises a new left reliant on a
‘rough-and-ready ideology’ combining three
elements: ‘networked activism’, ‘ a focus on
party politics to achieve state power’ and a
‘relentless focus on the issues, language and
concerns of ordinary people’.39 Clearly this
amounts to a major detour from left ortho-
doxy, whereby ‘the old relationship between
the urban salariat and the ex-industrial
working class has inverted’ and Labour is the
de facto party of the urban salariat with a
new heartland in ‘Remainia’.40 Yet rather
than being confronted as a political or ideo-
logical problem, this shift is presented as
awash with possibilities for the much-
vaunted new politics of postcapitalism. For
Mason ‘it is no disaster for Labour to find its
core support among this demographic—be-
cause it is the future of the workforce in any
successful twenty-first century capitalism’.
Suggesting that networks which now pro-
duce value—found primarily amongst the
urban, networked, educated youth as the tra-
ditional working class is replaced and rede-
fined by apparently unstoppable
technological change—are simultaneously
the new agents to confront capital, has politi-
cal implications not only in terms of new
policy innovations, but in the construction of
electoral coalitions. Nandy’s contribution to
this special issue seeks to take on some of
this thinking in application to the political
realities of post-referendum Britain.
Where earlier post-work thinkers like
Andre Gorz saw the proletarian revolution-
ary subject wilting away in its role as capital-
ism’s gravedigger, Mason sees the networked
individual stepping into its shoes—both pro-
duced and manipulated by the political, eco-
nomic, and technological tendencies of
contemporary capitalism, but also coming to
gradual consciousness as the agent of its rev-
olutionary overthrow.41 Indeed, Mason sees
the networked individual as more powerful
than the proletariat, able to create ‘islands of
abundance and self-control’ through the
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hyperconnected infrastructure of info-capital-
ism and being wound into circuits of finan-
cialisation and circulation through their
indebtedness and the ‘productive’ character
of their consumption in a platform-mediated
world, where user data is commodified and
valorised by capital. This grants the new sub-
jects of social transformation leverage in the
sphere of circulation previously unavailable
to the production-based class actors of the
past. Classical worker struggles for a greater
degree of reward or control within the sys-
tem seldom gestured beyond the alienation
of liberal democratic capitalism—struggling,
as Mason puts it, ‘for far more than just
wages and trade unions but much less than
socialist revolution’.42 Labour politics have
largely served to shore up the autonomy and
freedom of workers within the system whilst
laying claim to a greater share of the spoils.
Mason implies that the new class subjectivi-
ties of the networked society potentiate a
radical leap beyond this.
But in a world falling apart, it might well
be a better bet to replicate some of those
older forms of struggle as a bottom-up way
of defending what we have already. This
would run against the grain of those such as
Bastani, who suggest the labour movement
should stay well clear of ‘forms of worker
organising’ and political activity premised
on the institutions and mediations of a bro-
ken ‘society of work’ rapidly ‘passing away’.
On the global stage, it is also necessary to
confront what Bastani calls, in language jar-
ringly redolent of right-wing conspiracy the-
orists, the ‘cult of globalism’ and its
insistence on ‘international coordination’ as
the solution to contemporary challenges.
These ‘multilateral compromises’ Bastani
sees as nothing more than the expression of
‘elite interests’.43 What is needed, Bastani
argues, is a return to the nation-state as the
horizon of political action. Liberal claims that
this would obviously result in a thirties-style
unravelling are little more, he suggests, than
‘anti-utopianism’ and ‘capitalist realism’, per-
mitting no positive change in the present.
Mason, meanwhile, places judicious
emphasis on the need to defend imperfect
institutions and protect the global order.
What strikes him as suspect in the contem-
porary time is the combination of justified
‘geopolitical despair’ about liberal decline
and misplaced ‘technological euphoria’ about
the capacity of the so-called Fourth Indus-
trial Revolution—a ‘hi-tech, automation-dri-
ven, green future’—to overcome this
generational catastrophe.44 In this respect,
Mason’s work has become more circumspect,
specifically about the threat that technologi-
cal solutionism poses to universal and
inalienable human rights. As was pointed
out at the time, Postcapitalism’s celebration of
an increasingly interconnected world potenti-
ating the rise of a new revolutionary subject
was quickly outpaced by the online prolifer-
ation of racism, denialism and disinforma-
tion.45 In Clear Bright Future, this world
appears as a crucible for machines, platforms
and algorithms that, by ‘sucking the life-
blood out of human choice and reason’, facil-
itate a ‘war on liberal, democratic values’
through the national-populist ascendancy.46
Mason’s recommended route for combat-
ting authoritarianism is a humanist commit-
ment to the universalism nationalists and
populists despise—centring on the primacy
of ‘the human being, with universal rights’.47
Humanism, Mason suggests, universalises
what identitarianism and authoritarianism
particularises and relativises, smashing
through ‘identities imposed on us by pov-
erty, racism and sexism’.48 Mason’s ‘radical
humanism’—replacing ‘postcapitalism’ as his
central intellectual project—is an assault on
four faces of contemporary anti-humanism:
neuroscience presenting human behaviour as
predetermined; relativistic attacks on univer-
sal rights and concepts of human essence;
market economics reducing human life to
rational calculation and utility maximisation;
and, most importantly, academic and popu-
lar posthumanism seeking the transcendence
of human limits through new technology.
The last of these—addressed in this special
issue in contributions by Gildea and Pitts—
Mason describes as a ‘reactionary thought-
system’ arising from the left, but picked up
and run with by reactionary Silicon Valley
pseudo-visionaries like Peter Thiel.49 Whilst
Mason relates it in places to structuralist
Marxism, his association of it with a post-
modernist, relativistic approach to science
and reason rings truer, specifically that stem-
ming from Bruno Latour’s conceptualisation
of scientific facts as ‘socially constructed’ and
society as nothing more than a simple ‘part
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of nature’.50 Underpinned by a vision of a
single undifferentiated reality over which
human knowledge has as much or as little
claim as nature or ‘inert matter’, this draws
an ontological equivalence between human
life and non-human living things like ani-
mals and plants and inanimate objects like
machines.51 This vitalist ontology is repre-
sented most notably in the ‘object-oriented
ontology’ from which contemporary acceler-
ationism has gained at least some of the
intellectual succour for its worryingly attrac-
tive political programme.52
Posthumanism’s attempt to overturn the
supposed ‘oppression’ to which the non-hu-
man world is subject at the hands of human
thought and practice has dangerous ethical
consequences.53 Mason notes the trend
within currently fashionable environmental-
ist and animal liberationist politics to rhetori-
cally bemoan human existence itself, or even
will into being its elimination—a prospect
the current moment brings into cruel focus.
Chiming with what has been, until lately, a
profoundly anti-human cultural and political
moment, the posthumanist worldview
negates humans as nothing more than
strings of information, proposing that ‘we
are already posthuman’ insofar as whether a
body or a computer carries this information
is of secondary importance.54 The apparently
accomplished character of this state of affairs
discourages resistance against a technological
singularity uniting humans and machines.
Whereas Bastani follows others in the
postcapitalist literature by eulogising new
technology’s potential to transcend human
limits, Mason rejects this Prometheanism for
a more pessimistic understanding of human
life as meaningful only within those limits.55
Mason follows Francis Fukuyama in suggest-
ing that applications of biotechnology, like
bionic arms and gene editing, create advan-
tages and inequalities that erode the ‘univer-
sality of our human essence’.56 But Mason
differs in suggesting humans can socially
determine this ‘essence’ through the applica-
tion of technology to dominate nature. Here
the narrative of ‘unleashing individual free-
dom’ through the abolition of our ‘need to
work’ makes a reappearance from the earlier
and more optimistic prospectus presented in
Postcapitalism. But it is precisely our distance
from nature than burdens humankind with
the need to dominate it through work as a
purposeful, transformative intercourse with
the world around us in the first place. Whilst
wage labour is an historically specific media-
tion of this relationship and can be struggled
over politically as such, it is difficult to see a
form of human life that would absolve us of
‘work’ in this broader sense.
Conclusion: the end of the end of
history?
For adherents of postcapitalism, history is
back. The literature is characterised by obli-
gatory derision of Fukuyama’s ‘end of his-
tory’ thesis, informed by Mark Fisher’s
critique of the condition of ‘capitalist realism’
whereby—in the phrase attributed variously
to Slavoj Zizek and Fredric Jameson—it is
easier to imagine the end of the world than
the end of capitalism.57 But the underlying
political assumption that a desirable alterna-
tive to liberal democratic, free-market capi-
talism fell with the Berlin Wall is as
questionable as the empirical assessment that
a viable alternative exists today. The only
proof Bastani offers that ‘capitalist realism is
already coming apart’ in the face of a real
alternative is ‘the fact you are reading these
words at all’—a unilateral declaration of
independence from false consciousness
wherein all it takes is to free one’s mind and
the world will follow.58
Mason, meanwhile, advances a more clear-
sighted assessment of the risks of history’s
return, taking issue less with Fukuyama’s
normative vision than liberalism’s lack of
stomach defending it. He situates the ugly
end of the end of history in the great unrav-
elling in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis,
‘a crisis of legitimacy for the free-market sys-
tem’ that steadily escalated into ‘an attack
on democracy and human rights’.59 In this
context, the return of history has brought
not progress, but regression, at the hands of
‘forces opposed to science and democracy’.60
With coronavirus, the world reels from
another crisis seemingly jump-starting his-
tory anew. But as a continuation and exacer-
bation of the same morbid symptoms Mason
describes, the coronavirus may not change
the current state of affairs so much as realise
what lies latent within it, extending and
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intensifying existing dynamics towards a
digitally-enabled post-liberal nation-state
rather than paving the long road to utopian
socialist renewal. Where the latter path
implies that the left strike an offensive pos-
ture typical of postcapitalist thinking, the
former implies a watchful defence of imper-
fect principles and institutions—rhetorically
and practically a much harder sell. The pan-
demic may seem to suspend temporarily the
debates featured in this special issue, but in
many ways the wider spirit of rumination
on social, political and economic transforma-
tion sparked by the crisis renders them
more, not less, pressing.
Offstage, at the time of writing, the Labour
leadership election draws to a close, promis-
ing an ideological and strategic reset. In its
post-Marxist appraisal of the socially trans-
formative potential of technological change,
the postcapitalist left appears paradoxically
descendent of the Blairite ‘third way’ to
which Corbynism purportedly posed an
alternative. New Labour’s privileging of cer-
tain sections of the electorate, based on tech-
nologically determinist assertions about the
withering away of the working class, played
out in both the politics of Brexit and Cor-
bynism’s rise and subsequent fall with the
2019 election. But, driven by similarly opti-
mistic readings of the progressive potentiali-
ties of contemporary political economy, both
Blairism and Corbynism absolve the left of
the task of confronting the ‘progressive
dilemma’.61 As with New Labour’s ‘knowl-
edge economy’ hype, the Labour Party is
once again in danger of wishing away
labour market realities for techno-utopian
over-confidence, sidestepping the political
imperative of improving the quality of work.
And, having redefined the left’s base along
the restrictive demographic lines of the
urban, educated, networked youth and their
transcendent potential, it is hard to chart a
path to electoral coalitions that cut across
classes and geographies sufficiently to gain
and retain power in the wake of the disas-
trous 2019 election result.62 The radical left
faces the added obstacle of confronting this
problem in a position of alienation from tra-
ditional representative democracy—an out-
sider status to which, with the exception of a
few converts to reconciliation with the politi-
cal centre, they are now returning, following
the failed experiment of Corbynism. As par-
tisans of postcapitalism like Mason peel
away from the remnants of the Corbyn pro-
ject, there is a need for something new to
stand in the wreckage that places less faith
in the potential of technological development
and its beneficiaries to achieve social trans-
formation.
In a world stricken by manifold crises, unti-
mely over-optimism is by no means a condi-
tion confined to the left. The same messianic
expectations invested in the likes of Corbyn
by a small, but loud, section of his support,
chime with Trump’s ‘make America great
again’ mantra and the demand that Britons
‘believe’ in even the hardest Brexit insofar as
contemporary politics conspires to expel, at
all costs, sceptics, spoilsports, and sticks-in-
the-mud, who declaim impossible dreams of
sovereignty and control. Automated luxury
may sound more attractive, but is no less
unattainable. In the face of the dreams of left
and right alike, today, pessimists appear to
be the ones with the problem, out of touch
with the possibilities with which the present
is pregnant. But in an age of authoritarian
populism, these possibilities are seldom as
they seem. Whilst some parts of the left read
the coronavirus crisis as an epochal sign that
free-market capitalism is crumbling, the actu-
ally-existing character of present political and
economic possibilities appears as likely to
vindicate the pessimists by inaugurating
something even worse that expedites, rather
than extinguishes, foregoing tendencies
towards digital authoritarianism. This special
issue is a contribution to the sorting through
of the fruits of the contemporary left’s
engagement over the wider question of work
and capitalism in the digital age, and what, if
anything, we might find in the ‘post-’ that we
are told lies beyond them.
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